Cosmogony. Contemporary cosmology may seem to pose a more serious challenge to spatiomaterialism than current theories about the basic particles. The prevailing belief is that the universe began with a big bang and has been expanding ever since, and if that is true, spatiomaterialism false. Indeed, if that is true, it is not possible to explain the natural world ontologically. There can be no such explanation in a world that begins with the big bang. (For a recent account of modern cosmological theories, see Hawley, 1998.)

Big bang cosmogony. According to the big bang theory, space and matter came into existence at some finite time in the past. (One group holds that it was about 20 billion years ago, and another group holds that it was closer to 10 billion years ago). Before that, there was nothing. No space. No matter. Not even time. At that first moment in time, matter is supposed to exist in a highly energetic state, something like a radiation field with very high energy photons (called gamma rays), and the pressure of this radiation is supposed to cause the expansion. The big bang might be likened to an explosion, except there was, of course, no space for it to expand into. Rather space came into existence with the expansion. That is when time began. Indeed, the theory assume that what exists besides energy is spacetime, not space, and thus, that spacetime was at the beginning tightly curved. The intense radiation field would include all the forces of nature, including the Higgs field, and the energy of those fields, being equivalent to mass, is supposed to have given rise to all the kind of basic particles. The big bang and the subsequent expansion of space is just the increase from zero in the separation of basic objects in spacetime, and since it is the expansion of spacetime itself, and not an event in spacetime, the expansion can be faster than the speed of light in space.

As spacetime itself expanded, the temperature fell. At some point (between 10 and 100 billion degrees Kelvin), the temperature fell far enough for nucleons that had been used into the simplest nuclei to be stable. They were the nuclei of helium (with two protons and two neutrons each), deuterium (an isotope of hydrogen, with both a proton and a neutron), and a few other simple nuclei (such as helium-3 and lithium).

As space expanded further, there was a time about 100,000 years after the big bang when electrons coupled with protons and other nuclei to form atoms. As a result, photons could travel long distances through space without interacting with charged particles.

Subsequent expansion of space led somehow to the formation of galaxies of stars. Indeed, what formed were not only galaxies, but also clusters of galaxies and superclusters of galaxies. It is not at clear how this would happen, or even how stars would form, because when matter is distributed evenly throughout space, there are no net gravitational forces. Presumably, there was an uneven distribution of matter in space, but its origin is still obscure.

The expansion of the universe continues to this day, though it is assumed that the expansion is being slowed down by the gravitational attraction among bits of matter throughout the universe. One of the unresolved issues is whether there is enough matter in the universe to bring its expansion to a halt at the end of time, as most cosmologists would like to believe. A greater quantity of matter would stop the expansion in a finite period of time, causing a contraction which would draw all the matter in the universe (and presumably spacetime) itself back towards a gigantic collapse. But it now appears that the amount of matter (per unit volume) detected in the universe is only about 5 to 10% of what would be needed to stop the expansion, which would force cosmologists to believe that the universe will expand forever.

There is a variant of the big bang theory, the so-called “inflationary” view, due to Alan Guth, which holds that there was a period of very rapid, accelerating expansion very early on (10^-33 seconds after the big bang). In one billionth the time it takes light to cross the diameter of an atomic nucleus, there was a huge expansion, increasing distances in space on the order of 10⁵⁰ times. This would transform submicroscopic distances into cosmic distances, and the reason for this late addition to the big bang theory is that it would explain why the temperature of the universe is the same no matter how far we look in any direction from earth. Without this early inflation, the big bang would have results in a very lumpy universe. But it implies that the universe is much larger than the visible universe, though still finite.

Incompatibility of spatiomaterialism with big bang cosmogony. The big bang theory is incompatible with spatiomaterialism for two reasons, one because it contradicts its assumption about the infinity of time and the other because it contradicts its assumption about the nature of space. .

Time. Part of what makes spatiomaterialism the best ontological explanation of the world is its assumption that existence itself is in time. That assumption about the nature of existence and time entails a certain interpretation of ontological explanation, for an ontological explanation of the world explains everything in the world and everything about the world by showing how it is constituted by substances, and to hold that existence is in time is to hold that the substances used as ontological causes endure through time. If substances never come into existence nor ever go out of existence, any world constituted by them will be temporally infinite in extent.

This is admittedly not the only way of taking ontology to be explanatory. We have acknowledged that it is possible to hold that time is just an aspect of what exists. That is what Einsteinians who take spacetime to be a substances assume about the ultimate nature of the world. Spatiotemporalism, as I called the Einsteinian ontology, is compatible with the belief that the universe had a beginning in time, for it implies merely that there is a limit to the temporal extent of spacetime as a substance that is not itself in time. That makes it possible for cosmologists to accept the big bang explanation of the origin of the world.

The same difference between substantivalism about space and substantivalism about spacetime arises concerning the end of the world. It is possible, according to the big bang theory that the universe might stop expanding and collapse back on itself, and some cosmologists hold that such an outcome would mean that time comes to an end. That would make time finite in the direction of the future as well as toward the past. Such a belief is compatible with Einsteinian ontology, because it would merely mean that the temporal dimension of spacetime as a substance comes to an end in both directions.

There is, however, no way to reconcile spatiomaterialism with either a beginning or an end to the universe it time, because in either case, it would be to give up its view about the nature of existence and time and, thereby, the kind of ontological explanation it gives. To be sure, it is possible for ontologists to hold that existence is in time and to believe the universe had a beginning. That is the view that theists hold. The big bang could be just the way in which God created the world, and the need for such an explanation of the big bang explains why the Pope authorized discussion of the big bang theory so early in its career. But theism gives up naturalism, which is the first of our basic assumption. Any God who could create the natural world would have to be outside space and time and, thus, not something that naturalism can accept.

Space. The other reason that spatiomaterialism cannot accept the big bang explanation of the origin and development of the universe is what it believes about space, and two aspects of its assumptions are at stake. One is its theoretical preference for believing that space is infinite, and the other is its basic assumption that space is a substance.

Infinity.  Ontologists would prefer to believe that space is infinite in extent, as well as in its divisibility, because that is the simplest theory. The essential nature of each part of space can be defined as having three-dimensional geometrical relations to every other part of space, for each part would have such relations to a different, ordered set of other parts of space. But if space is finite, each part must have a different essential nature, because each part will have a different spatial relation to the edge of space. And that is not to mention the problem in explaining how space could have an end. 

If space is infinite in extent, it is hard to see how space could expand, because there would be, so to speak, no room for more space. All the places in space would already exist. How could ontologists make any sense of the notion?

Cosmologists assume that they can take space to be finite in extent without encountering any problems about the end of space by holding that spacetime throughout the universe is curved. If spacetime contains enough matter, then Einstein’s general theory of relativity implies that a spacetime universe will curve back on itself. If we use two-dimensional space to represent three-dimensional space, then this possibility is supposed to be modeled by the geometry of the surface of a sphere (or Riemannian geometry). But that is not a possible form of spatiomaterialism, because spatiomaterialism replaces the belief in curved spacetime with the belief in the acceleration of the inherent motion in absolute, three dimensional space. Apart from Einstein’s general theory of relativity, there is no reason to believe that space is curved. Indeed, there is no reason to believe that curved space is even possible, if space is a substance. The ability to construct a formal axiom system for curved space does not show that it is ontologically possible.

Substantivalism. Though it is possible for space to be finite in extend in a spatiomaterial world, it is not possible for space to expand. To be sure, if space were finite, the lack of room for the expansion of space would not be a problem. But there would still be an insuperable ontological objection to assuming that it expands, because if space is a substance, the expansion of space would be just another way for something to come from nothing. The measure of space is the distance between parts of space in three dimensions, and if distances were actually increasing, there would have to be more spatial substance separating the points.

Since the big bang theory contradicts spatiomaterialism, it is relevant for ontological philosophy to consider the reasons for believing in the big bang, for they may provide reasons for doubting that spatiomaterialism can be used to do philosophy in this new way. There are two kinds of reasons for believing in big bang cosmogony and the subsequent expansion of the universe, one theoretical and the other empirical, and as we shall see, neither is a good reason for doubting that this is a spatiomaterial world. 

Theoretical foundation of big bang cosmogony. The theory behind big bang cosmogony is Einstein’s general theory of relativity. In 1917, shortly after completing his general theory of relativity and before Hubble had discovered evidence of the expansion of the universe, Einstein himself turned his attention to cosmology. Einstein used the basic equation of his general theory of relativity to represent the entire universe, assuming, in effect, that the universe contains a finite quantity of mass and is finite in extent. A finite universe was not implausible to Einstein, because he believed in spacetime, rather than space enduring through time, and a finite spacetime universe can contain enough mass and energy for spacetime to curve back on itself, giving the universe as a whole a spherical geometry. There would be no edges of space to explain, because traveling far enough in any direction would bring one back to where one started.

Einstein soon discovered, however, that even in a universe with spherical geometry, gravitation, being a universal attractive force, would quickly lead to the collapse of the universe. The tendency toward gravitational collapse is even greater than in the Newtonian counterpart of Einstein’s way of representing the universe (which takes the universe to be a finite sphere of material objects in infinite space all attracting one another). On its own, Einstein’s universe would crash in on itself in about the time required for light to cross the universe.

In order to keep his equation from predicting the collapse of the universe, Einstein introduced the so-called “cosmological constant.” It was a perfectly legitimate move, because it was a constant of integration. That is, his general relativity equation had to be integrated in order to represent the universe, and Einstein initially set the constant of integration as zero.

The left side of Einstein’s equation in the general theory is a differential equation that represents the metric of curved spacetime, while the right side of his equation represents the presence of mass and energy in spacetime. To set the constant of integration on the right side equal to zero was to assume, in effect, that the force of gravitation falls to zero at great distances. That is what led to the problem of collapse of the universe.

It was also possible to set the constant of integration at something other than zero. That would represent a repulsive force between material objects at great distances from one another. It would be a very small force at short range, such as the solar system, but the repulsive force would increase with distance. Hence, it would be the dominant force at large scales, and his general relativity equation would no longer predict the collapse of the universe. This was the origin of the cosmological constant. It suggested that there is a form of negative energy associated with the vacuum, and it could make the universe static by canceling out the gravitational attraction at great distances.

The cosmological constant was destined, however,, however, to be rejected, because it implied that the universe is unstable. Though it could be used to represent a static state in which gravitation and long-range repulsion are equal, it was inevitably a precarious balance. The problem is that gravitation falls off with the square of distance, while the repulsive force represented by the cosmological constant increases linearly with distance. Thus, a slight contraction in the universe would make the gravitational force stronger than the repulsive force could resist and the universe would collapse. On the other hand, a slight expansion of the universe would make the repulsive force stronger than gravitation, and the universe would expand faster and faster. In either case, it was not likely to remain the same size.

When Edwin Hubble’s evidence for the expansion of the universe became known in 1929, it seemed that Einstein’s mistake was the attempt to represent the universe as static. If the universe is expanding, the size of the universe must be a dynamic phenomenon. Since his equations had told him, in effect, that the universe is not static, Einstein retracted his cosmological constant. He called it his “biggest blunder,” which big bang cosmologists rarely fail to mention, taking comfort in his agreement.

The equation from Einstein’s general theory of relativity was adapted for big bang cosmogony, because it could be used to represent a universe in which the initial pressure and outward momentum of the expansion is countered by the universal gravitational attraction. The “Einstein-de Sitter model of the universe” is one such theory. It holds that gravitation will bring the expansion of the universe to a halt at the end of eternity. Preference for this view has posed a problem for cosmologists, because all indications are that there is far less matter in the universe than such a limit to its expansion would require.

Spatiomaterialists critique. Ontological philosophy has a different way of interpreting Einsteinian cosmology which is based on its ontological explanation of the truth of Einstein’s general theory of relativity. Spatiomaterialism assumes that space is an infinite, three dimensional substance enduring through time, and it explains why Einstein’s general relativity equation yields true predictions of gravitational phenomena by holding that the accumulation of matter at any location in space causes an inbound acceleration of the inherent motion in the surrounding space. On this view, space is assumed to be infinite, and the so-called called the “curvature of spacetime” turns out to be just an acceleration of the inherent motion of space (that is, an acceleration of the ether, as an aspect of space). If that effect of matter accumulation of space is what makes Einstein’s equation true, then there much to criticize in its use as the theoretical underpinning for big bang cosmology.

The most basic objection to Einsteinian cosmogony is the use of Einstein’s question to represent the entire universe. That is to assume that the universe contains only a finite amount of mass and energy (that is, matter) and that spacetime is finite. But thus far in this ontological argument, we have still found no reason to believe that space is finite in extent or that the total quantity of matter is finite.

This is not to deny that Einstein’s general relativity equation can be used to represent a sizable chunk of the universe. Indeed, the truth of that representation is what was explained ontologically in the General theory of relativity. But when we recognize that it represents only a region of space and the matter contained by that region, we can see that Einstein’s introduction of a cosmological constant was not a mistake at all, but merely a way of representing the infinity of the space and matter outside that region.

Einstein introduced the cosmological constant as a constant of integration in the integration of his general relativity equation. But he introduced it on the right-hand side of that equation. Since that side represents the mass and energy contained in the region, the cosmological constant that was needed to make the universe static seems to represent a repulsive force which is counteracting gravitational attraction.

However, the constant of integration could have been introduced on the left hand side of Einstein’s general relativity equation, which represents the metric of spacetime. That may seem like a mere mathematical correction to the geometry of curved spacetime. But it could be interpreted as representing the infinity of space and matter beyond the region covered by the equation. If the universe is infinite, rest of the universe is, in effect, tugging at the edges of the finite region of spacetime represented by the equation, keeping its overall curvature flat. The cosmological constant does not represent a negative force that increases with distance, but simply a constant of integration that must be included in order to take into account the rest of the infinite universe.

Thus, ontological philosophy would lead us to see Einstein’s greatest blunder, not as introducing the cosmological constant, but as giving it up. For that concession comes from failing to recognize that what is described by his general theory is just a gravitational force that works through space in a world in which space is an infinite substance enduring through time, that is, in which space and time are absolute. Einstein’s mistake was to believe in spacetime.

Thus, we conclude that the truth of Einstein’s general theory of relativity gives us no reason to think that the universe might be expanding and, thus, no reason to believe that it began with a big bang. 

Empirical foundation of big bang cosmogony. Though Einstein’s general theory of relativity is the main theoretical reason for believing in a big bang, it is probably not the most important reason. The most persuasive reasons are empirical. It seems to be the best explanation of three phenomena: the apparent explanation of the universe, the proportion of helium in the universe, and the background radiation. However, in a spatiomaterial world, as we shall see, there is another possible explanation of those same phenomena, and it is far more plausible.

Hubble’s law. In 1929, Hubble published the result of his work at the Mount Wilson gathering evidence about the spectra of distant galaxies. He reported that galaxies are moving away from earth, and moving away faster the farther away they already are. That is Hubble’s law.

Hubble found a red-shift in the electromagnetic radiation from distant galaxies, that is, a shift of radiation from known sources toward longer wavelengths, and as far as he could measure (about 10 million light years), the red-shift increased directly with the galaxy’s distance. Such a shift could be explained as a Doppler effect. It is well established that the wavelength of a signal sent from an object moving away is elongated. Assuming that the red-shift he had observed is a Doppler effect, Hubble argued that the galaxies he had observed were moving away from earth, and his data indicated that the farther galaxies were away from earth, the faster they were moving. Hubble’s law states that the recession velocity of a galaxy increases directly with its distance, and the constant of proportionality is Hubble’s constant.

Hubble’s own calculation of his constant is now though to have been off by a factor of two, though to this day, there is still considerable uncertainty about what it is. Current measurements seem to cluster around two different values. (One group finds that galaxies have about 15 kilometers per second of additional velocity for every million years of additional distance from earth, while another group finds them to have about 25 kilometers per second of additional velocity for every million years of additional distance from earth.) 

The correlation between the distance to a galaxy and the velocity its recession suggests that the whole universe is expanding, because that is how it would appear not only from earth, but everywhere, if the universe were expanding. Though strictly speaking, the red-shift of distant galaxies would not be a Doppler effect, because their recession velocity does not come from moving through space, but rather from the expansion of space itself, it is assumed to come to the same thing quantitatively. (The wavelength of a photon is supposed to increase with the expansion of the space it is crossing.) 

Hubble’s law makes it possible to calculate the age of universe, because if galaxies are all receding from one another as that law describes, there must have been some time in the past at which they were all located together at the same point. Current estimates tend to cluster on either an age of about 20 billion years or 10 billion years, depending on which value of the Hubble constant one accepts. There is considerable room for error. First, it is necessary to separate out the “peculiar motion” of galaxies which is caused by local gravitational effect (and that is a significant factor, since nearby galaxies are the ones mainly used to measure Hubble’s constant). And if the expansion of the universe has been slowing down because of the gravitational attraction between galaxies, as cosmologists assume, then the estimate of the age of the universe should be considerably lower (by as much as one-third).

Nucleosynthesis. The measured expansion of the universe supports the idea that the universe began with a big bang, but that idea was first proposed by George Gamow in 1947. The evidence Gamow offered for such a beginning is the prediction of the proportion of helium and other light elements in the universe, which has been confirmed. 

Gamow thought of the initial state of the universe as being nothing but an intense radiation with a very high temperature. He assumed that the objects with rest mass would be created by high energy photons. (Since most of the rest mass in the universe is now composed of baryons, that would not explain what happened to all the antibaryons that must have been created at the same time.) And Gamow assumed that the pressure of radiation at such a high temperature was responsible for the expansion the universe, though without any space outside into which it could expand, it had to create its own space. 

Particles would be created, and as the expansion continued, the temperature would fall. Gamow recognized that at some point the density of nucleons and the energy of their interaction would be enough for nucleons fused into small nuclei to be stable (between 10 and 100 billion degrees Kelvin). He explained the proportion of helium (with two protons and two neutrons) that is found in the universe (about 25 to 28 percent by weight). Similar reasons can be given for the proportion of matter in the form of deuterium (one proton and one neutron), helium-3 (two protons and one neutron), and some lithium and boron.

Since there is no other plausible explanation of their relative abundance in the universe, this is good empirical evidence of a period in the past during which the temperature of the universe was once much higher than it is now and that is has been falling since then.

Background radiation. In 1966, Arno Penzias and Robert W. Wilson, discovered radiation coming from all directions in space, day and night, every season of the year in the microwave region of the electromagnetic spectrum. It was the wavelength that one would expect of an object with a temperature of 2.7 degrees above absolute zero. They recognized that the radiation must have a cosmic source, and they argued that it must have been caused by the big bang and the subsequent expansion of the universe.

The radiation must come from a period long after the nucleosynthesis discovered by Gamow, because for a long period of time, the electromagnetic radiation would have been sufficiently energetic to break any bonds that electrons might form  with the nuclei bouncing around at the time. About 100,000 years after the big bang itself the universe would have expanded enough for the temperature to fall to a level that would allow atoms to be stable. Neutralizing the charges of electrons and nuclei in that way allowed photons to pass unhindered for great distances. The period at which the universe became transparent would explain the origin of the cosmic background radiation.

These empirical reasons for believing in the big bang are independent of general relativity. Even though spatiomaterialism can reject Einsteinian cosmology because of the assumptions it makes, these observations are still evidence for the big bang. But since they are just observations, they support the belief that the universe has been expanding ever since a big bang only if that is the best explanation of them. Thus, the empirical foundation for contemporary cosmogony can be undermined by offering a better explanation of those observations. There is at least one way that spatiomaterialism can do just that.